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1. Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 96 (1928) (footnote omitted).
2. 123 S. Ct. 1179 Ct. (2003 . Ewing concerned a challenge to California's "three-strikes" law and was decided along with a companion case, Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 Ct. (2003 , which raised the same challenge in the context of a federal habeas action.
v. Campbell,' the Court offered answers that were simultaneously predictable and in interesting tension with one another.
In its sentencing decisions, the Court has identified substantive and procedural constraints that are doctrinally independent of one another. In the substantive line of cases, the Court has announced a relatively deferential principle of proportionality: the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment forbids a sentence that is grossly disproportionate to the defendant's crime. 4 The Court has also identified a gross disproportionality principle under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 5 In a more recent and procedural line of cases, the Court has emphasized the central role of the jury: the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require that a jury find, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, all the facts necessary to authorize a particular criminal punishment. 6 Thus, a defendant's eligibility for a longer sentence cannot be the result of judicial fact-finding. Not only are the substantive and procedural lines of cases doctrinally independent, but they may stand in some tension with one another.! By contrast, the punitive damages decisions have taken a more doctrinally integrated approach. Substantively, the Court has again adopted a test that centers on proportionality, this time locating the requirement within the Due Process Clauses. [o] ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"); see also Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 Ct. , 2443 Ct. (2002 (applying Apprendi to aggravating factors and capital sentencing).
7. Indeed, Justice Breyer's dissent from the Apprendi line of cases is based to some extent on his sense that leaving important aspects of sentencing to juries is likely to produce inconsistent sentences. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 556-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). The Court earlier rejected the argument that punitive damages in cases involving private parties could violate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 264 (1989) ; see infra text accompanying notes 128-69 (describing the path of recent doctrinal development) and text accompanying notes 106-27 (discussing the articulation of a proportionality requirement un-But with respect to damages, the Court's procedural solution takes power away from juries: it provides for de novo review of the jury's decision. Leaving the power to assess punitive damages entirely with the jury, the Court has held, risks arbitrary and disproportionate awards.
This essay looks at the sentencing and punitive damages decisions in tandem. 1 0 Here, as in several other areas, the Court's approaches to similar questions in the civil and criminal arenas take very different turns. Part I considers the Court's articulation of proportionality tests under the Eighth Amendment (for criminal sentences and fines) and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (for punitive damages). The sentencing decisions have a head start of roughly a decade on the punitive damages ones. So it's interesting that, having sharply cut back on proportionality review of criminal sentences, the Court has identified a proportionality principle for criminal fines and enthusiastically embarked upon a similar enterprise with respect to punitive damages.
The excessive punishment cases show that proportionality is both an inherently alluring and an inevitably unsatisfactory measure of constitutionality. The problem is not the content of the principle: the Constitution certainly provides sufficient support for concluding that punishment cannot be excessive or arbitrarily unrelated to a defendant's misdeeds, and even in the absence of a constitutional command, it is hard to imagine an argument in favor of arbitrariness. Rather, the problem lies in der the Excessive Fines Clause). [Vol 88:880 translating the principle into a standard for judicial oversight. For all the Court's invocation of objective factors, it turns out that a key aspect of proportionality review remains fundamentally subjective. Unless they are prepared to adopt a mechanical rule," appellate courts can do little more than "prick the lines," and even those lines do little to create a clear pattern for other actors to follow.
Part II looks at the Court's procedural decisions regarding criminal sentences and punitive damages. Given the convergence of substantive constitutional principles in the sentencing and damages cases, what accounts for the sharp divergence in the role the Supreme Court accords juries, reallocating authority to them and away from judges in criminal cases, while doing exactly the opposite in civil ones? At first blush, it may seem puzzling that the Supreme Court thinks not only that juries provide criminal defendants with an important constitutional protection but also that juries threaten to impose unconstitutionally excessive damages awards on civil defendants. The answer, I suggest, is not simply that the Court thinks that juries are systematically more biased against civil defendants than criminal ones. Instead, the Court's reaction may rest on institutional factors. Juries in criminal cases are circumscribed by statutory boundaries on their ability to authorize particular punishments and by centralized prosecutorial decisions. By contrast, the determination of punitive damages amounts is so much less constrained by the political branches that judicial oversight seems more important and justifiable.
I. THE ALLURE AND INTRACTABILITY OF PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW
Although the principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the defendant's crime "is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in common-law jurisprudence," 1 2 its status as a judicially enforceable constitutional command is a relatively 11. Several states have taken this approach. See infra note 138 (describing legislation that either caps the permissible amount of punitive damages expressly or that limits the amount of punitive damages to some multiplier of the amount of compensatory damages awarded). Beyond rules that simply foreclose a particular kind of punishment for a category of crime, e.g., Coker v. It is relatively rare for the Supreme Court to acknowledge, as it did last Term with respect to its decisions regarding proportionality and the Eighth Amendment, that its "precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity... [and] have not established a clear or consistent path for courts to follow."" 8 In fact, the Rehnquist Court has been engaged in an implicit "exit strategy," 14 refining the constitutional test in a way that "preserves the Court's ability to reenter the field should circumstances or doctrine or the Justices' view of the Constitution change,"" while essentially foreclosing relief in contemporary cases.
Consider, for example, the shift from Solem v. Helm 6 to Harmelin v. Michigan. 1 ' The two cases involved the same sentence-life in prison without possibility of parole-but very different crimes, defendants, and rules of institutional authority. Not surprisingly, particularly given the shift in the Court's membership, they produced different outcomes in the Supreme Court.
Jerry Helm was a habitual petty criminal who passed a bad check for $100.18 Normally, under South Dakota law, the 13. Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 Ct. , 1173 Ct. (2003 . Indeed, the Court found its prior decisions so murky that it essentially foreclosed federal habeas review of sentence length because, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, habeas relief can be granted only if the state courts' treatment of a petitioner's claim involves "an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) . Given the Court's prior decisions, which reached different outcomes on the basis of relatively small differences in the facts, it is probably always possible to show why the instant case is more like one case than another, and thus does not represent an "unreasonable" application of law.
14. I develop the concept of exit strategies more fully in Pamela S. But because Helm had been convicted of six prior felonies (each of them also graded as a relatively minor crime), South Dakota law enhanced the penalty for this offense, authorizing the judge to sentence Helm as a Class 1 felon. 20 State law authorized a maximum possible penalty for a Class 1 felony of life in prison (which, under state law, eliminated the possibility of parole)."' The judge in Helm's case, convinced that he was an incorrigible 22 recidivist, gave him that maximum.
By contrast, Ronald Harmelin was a first-time offender. 23 But his offense involved possession of a massive amount (672 grams-about a pound and a half) of cocaine. 24 Harmelin's sentence was not the result of a single judge's choice within a broad range. Michigan law provided a mandatory life sentence for anyone possessing more than 650 grams of a mixture con-25 taining a controlled substance like cocaine. So the judge in Harmelin's case imposed that mandatory minimum.
By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme Court struck down Helm's sentence, holding that it violated the Eighth Amendment because it was "significantly disproportionate to his crime." 2 6 To reach this conclusion, the Court articulated a test that relied on what it described as three "objective factors": 27 First, we look to the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.... Second, it may be helpful to compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction. If more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty, or to less serious penalties, that is some indication that the punishment at issue may be excessive.... Third, courts may find it useful to compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."
Helm's offense, the Court concluded, was relatively minor, since it involved only a small sum of money and no violence or vere authorized by South Dakota law." As to the second factor, the other crimes that exposed a defendant in South Dakota to a life sentence were far more serious-for example, murder, treason, and kidnapping. 3 1 At the same time, other far more serious crimes-for example, first-degree rape and aggravated assault-exposed perpetrators to far lower sentences. 32 Finally, with respect to the third factor, the Court observed that only one other state apparently even authorized the amount of punishment imposed on Helm and that no defendant had actually received such a sentence. 33 "proportionality review by federal courts should be informed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent," 37 but it recast the first factor into a threshold inquiry. Justice Kennedy described Harmelin's crime as a particularly serious one, not only because of the direct dangers posed to individuals who ingest illegal drugs but because of drugs' threat to public safety more generally. 3 8 Justice Kennedy pointed to studies and statistics showing that drug-induced physical, mental, or emotional changes might make it more likely that a user would commit serious and violent crimes; that drug users might commit property crime in order to finance their purchase of drugs; and that the drug trade itself involved violent crime.
39 "Given the serious nature of petitioner's crime," it was unnecessary even to consider the second or third factors identified in Solem: "intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality."'° Harmelin's was not such a case.
After Harmelin, then, the linchpin of constitutional proportionality review seemed to be a judgment about the gravity of the defendant's offense. In its most recent decision, Ewing v. California," although the Court purported to rely on the principles "distilled in Justice Kennedy's concurrence [to] guide our application of the Eighth Amendment," 4 2 the Court shifted gears yet again, treating gravity not just as a question of the offense for which a defendant is convicted but, more broadly, as a question of the future danger he poses to the community. 43 Gary Ewing was convicted of shoplifting golf clubs worth roughly $1200.
Under California law, this behavior was treated as felony grand theft, 5 a crime for which the maximum 37. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1000 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. [Vol 88:880 sual sodomy between adults 54 provides an especially pointed demonstration of the problem with treating the gravity of an offense as an eternal verity.
A more modest definition of "objective" would require simply that a judgment about offense gravity reflect more than "the subjective views of individual Justices." 55 It would rest on the more general Eighth Amendment principle that the definition of excessive punishments "draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. This raises immediately a central question: when is the imposition of an authorized sentence not conclusive evidence of contemporary standards? In a variety of contexts, the Court has stated that "the clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures." 57 Proportionality review has real bite, however, only when it overturns sentences that some law authorizes." So the central question is under what circumstances a court can look behind the "statutes passed by society's elected representatives.' 59 I see at least three possible answers that a court might give. The most modest depends on the observation that the sentence imposed on a particular defendant may fit the letter, but not the spirit of the law. Statutes almost by necessity sweep broadly. 0 In authorizing a particular punishment, legislators may have a paradigmatic example of a given crime in mind. The particular details of a defendant's case may take him far outside this "heartland." Perhaps because legislators are aware of this problem, they often delegate to individual decision makers, such as judges or juries or executive branch officials (prosecutors or parole boards), the power to shape a particular defen- dant's sentence. But sometimes those individual decision makers may themselves reach idiosyncratic conclusions, conclusions that seem at odds with the general consensus. In such case, proportionality review may intervene to strike the balance the legislature would have intended had it been faced with a particular defendant's case. This first justification is, in essence, a form of statutory, rather than constitutional, interpretation.
The Supreme Court treated Helm's case this way. The central appeal of Helm's claim was that he was the victim of a draconian judge. The fact that no other defendant in South Dakota with a record similar to Helm's had received a similar punishment underscored the likelihood that Helm's sentence was not one the legislature would have anticipated and approved. 61 A judge more attuned to the overall structure of South Dakota law would have concluded that someone whose record involved a string of Class 5 felonies should be thought a career petty criminal. Even if he should be punished more harshly as a recidivist than as a first-time offender, he should not be punished as if he were the most heinous of Class 1 felons. In short, the Solem Court "d[id] not question the legislature's judgment";62 rather, it rejected the judgment of a single judge.
A second, more far-reaching response turns on the idea that while legislation may be the "clearest" evidence of contemporary values, it is not always entirely "reliable." 6 There are good reasons to think that the legislative process may produce statutes that systematically exaggerate a crime's seriousness. Legislators face powerful political pressures that lead them to ratchet up sentences. 6 4 Even a legislator who thinks a particular sentence is unwarranted or believes that her constituents, on reflection, would view a sentence as unduly harsh (either categorically or with respect to some of the acts that fall within its scope) may fear being tarred as soft on crime if she votes [Vol 88:880 against a crime bill. 65 This problem may be exacerbated when legislation disables other mechanisms that might bring a sentence more into line with contemporary standards. Mandatory sentences may be particularly susceptible to this kind of criticism, since they make it impossible for sentencing judges or juries to fine-tune a defendant's punishment.
Harmelin's challenge fell within this second category and therefore demanded a higher degree of judicial intervention than Helm's. Harmelin could scarcely claim that he was the victim of an idiosyncratic judge: after all, he was subject to a mandatory sentence specified clearly by the Michigan Legislature for all defendants convicted of the crime of which he was found guilty. 66 Nor could he plausibly claim that a life sentence was invariably excessive for the crime of which he had been convicted: surely some defendants convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine merited such a punishment. 67 Thus, he was left with the argument that the constitutional flaw in the Michigan scheme was its mandatory nature, which denied him a sentencing determination tailored to the circumstances of his case.
The Harmelin Court squarely rejected the idea of an across-the-board "individualized sentencing doctrine" 6 8 for noncapital cases. Thus, mandatory sentences are not inherently suspect. But there are some circumstances in which courts might be skeptical of whether a particular mandatory sentence in fact reflects contemporary values: when mandatory sentences are coupled with expansive definitions of the triggering conduct or when the lawmaking process foreclosed more accurate tailoring. The California three strikes law illustrates these problems. The sentencing regime was enacted in part as a result of direct lawmaking. 69 Voters faced an up-or-down question whether repeat felons were to be sentenced to life in prison; they were not given a more targeted set of felonies that should trigger life terms. 70 Thus, the "three-strikes" law as it actually operates may demand life sentences for a number of defendants-the hungry, homeless man who stole a bottle of vitamins from a supermarket 7 1 or the nonviolent recidivist who shoplifted merchandise worth a total of $153.54 from a Kmart72 -whose situations were not within the contemplation of the voters.
The third and most expansive justification does not deny that a particular statute provides clear or reliable evidence of a community's view, but nonetheless denies the community's right to impose such a sentence for the behavior involved. This rationale is squarely substantive. It crops up more often with respect to the question whether a particular activity can be criminalized at all. Consider, for example, the Chicago antigang ordinance case, 73 76 If it is to be extended to acts that can be prohibited, but simply not punished too severelythe proverbial legislative decision to make "overtime parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment," 7 7 rather than a citation offense punishable by a small fine-then courts need some yardstick for gauging when punishment goes over the admittedly fuzzy line.
If that yardstick is to be objective-rather than a shocksthe-conscience-of-the-Justices test-it is hard to imagine how the second or third prong of the Solem test does not creep back into the inquiry. Surely, the clearest and most reliable evidence of contemporary standards other than the authorized sentence is likely to involve how the defendant's offense fits into the structure of the state's penal code or how defendants convicted of similar offenses, either within or without the state, are being treated. In short, the second and third prongs of the Solem test may be particularly useful pieces of evidence about the gravity of a defendant's offense and there is something disconcerting about trying to answer the question of how serious a defendant's crime is without looking at them.
But even if there were an objective measure of offense gravity, proportionality review of sentences would face a serious difficulty. Ironically, this problem is illustrated by the very evidence on which the Solem Court relied for its assertion that it was simple "to judge the gravity of an offense, at least on a relative scale"1 8 -an empirical study that showed "widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of crimes.
The study involved a survey in which respondents were asked to rate a series of acts on a nine-point scale, with "9" recial marriage as violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
75. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down a statute that criminalized the use of contraceptives as a violation of the Due Process Clause). Ironically, in an earlier challenge, the Court had declined even to reach the merits because it thought the statute was essentially a derelict on the waters of the law. flecting the most blameworthy." While there was a fair amount of agreement on the ordinal ranking of the 140 acts, the respondents' cardinal rankings varied wildly. 8 ' One particularly salient example: passing a worthless check for less than $100 (an offense almost identical to Helm's) was ranked 104th out of 140 offenses. 82 Its cardinal ranking was 5.339, but the variance was 5.921.83 So large a variance is a sign that, although the respondents might share a view of how serious crimes are relative to one another, they disagree profoundly about how serious crimes are in a more absolute sense. Indeed, the authors noted that "[tihe distribution of ratings tended to be more dense on the high serious end of the nine point scale: the most popular rating was '9,' with the lower ratings decreasing in popularity." 84 Widely shared views about relative seriousness may suggest that a crime with a lower ordinal rank should not be punished more harshly than a crime with a higher rank-for example, that someone who passes a bad check should not receive a higher sentence than someone who kills a stranger in a bar fight 8 5 -but they do not tell us very much about the question whether, if the latter crime warrants a sentence of up to life in prison, the former can be punished by a sentence of fifty years. That is, the ordinal rankings cannot readily be translated into a scale, which is, after all, what proportionality challenges to terms of imprisonment are really about. Put more concretely, even if a particular respondent gave passing a bad check a score essentially halfway between killing someone in a bar room free-for-all and refusing to answer a census taker's questions, 8 6 that does not mean that she thinks that passing a bad check can be punished by twice as severe a sentence as refusing to answer a census taker's questions but only half as long a sentence as killing someone. An individual's view about 80 Moreover, as the Court recognized in its discussion of offense gravity in Ewing v. California, agreement about offense seriousness may be only one component in thinking about appropriate punishment, particularly once the theory of sentencing extends beyond retribution." Consider a theory of sentencing in which deterrence plays a role. Imagine two offenses that are thought of, in the abstract, as causing a similar amount of harm-for example, passing a worthless check for less than $100 and bribing a public official. 88 If the former crime is easily detected and prosecuted, while the latter is hard to detect or prosecute, there may be widespread consensus that the second offense should be punished more severely, as in fact most criminal codes do. Thus, without knowing more than simple views of offense gravity, it might be difficult to say that the punishment for the second offense is unduly severe.
Of equal significance, the question the respondents were asked did not take into account the central factor that was involved in Helm's case, as well as Ewing's: recidivism. To say that people do not think passing one bad check is a serious crime says relatively little about whether they would consider someone a serious criminal if he were to commit that crime, or an array of similarly serious crimes, repeatedly. Oddly enough, although researchers continue to do studies designed to rank particular crimes, there is still no good study to determine whether there are widely shared views about how recidivism should be viewed. 88. In the Rossi study, the mean for the former was 5.339 and the mean for the latter was 5.394-scores that the authors tell us are in actuality indistinguishable. Rossi, supra note 80, at 227, 229.
89. The fact that during the 1990s there was "a sea change in criminal sentencing throughout the Nation" that resulted in far harsher treatment of recidivists, Ewing, 123 S. Ct. at 1187, at least suggests a contemporary consensus that recidivism justifies harsher punishments. For reasons I have already suggested, however, the consensus may break down when it comes to the degree of enhancement that is appropriate. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
Suppose, as seems entirely plausible, that there is a widely shared consensus that people who have demonstrated a propensity to commit offenses are more blameworthy than firsttime offenders." Looking at "the gravity of the offense" disconnected from the history of particular offenders will not pick up that consensus. Even under a purely retributive view of punishment, then, the data on which the Court relied may not indicate how seriously Helm's offense would be viewed.
Here, too, once one gets beyond retributive theories of sentencing, recidivism may complicate the question of proportionality. For example, the standard sentence for a given crime may reflect a judgment that most individuals will be deterred by that punishment. But recidivists reveal themselves to be insensitive to that level of sanction. Thus, deterrence theory could authorize confronting potential recidivists with a higher sentence. Similarly, if incapacitation is one of the purposes of punishment, then there may be good reasons for thinking that recidivists should be given longer sentences than first-time offenders.
The cases suggest that when it comes to recidivism, scaling is the key issue. There is no real controversy about the constitutionality of punishing recidivists more severely than firsttime offenders: the question is how much more severely. Is doubling the maximum penalty permissible? 9 1 What about squaring it or raising the maximum sentence in "three-strikes" cases to the third power? 92 Is raising the authorized penalty by one grade permissible? What about by two grades, or one additional grade for each additional conviction? 93 There really seem to be only three ways to answer the question of how much more severely recidivists can be punished. The first is to leave it entirely to the political process-the tack taken by the Justices who reject proportionality review altogether. The second is to look to "the legislation enacted by the country ' and to reject outliers as not reflecting the national standard embodied in the Eighth Amendment-the tack suggested by the last prong of the Solem test, 9 5 and relegated to a subsidiary position by Harmelin. 96 The third is for judges simply to make the decision themselves, which, whatever they call it or however mechanical the test they announce, involves judges applying their own views to the question of when a punishment is excessive.
In its recent decision forbidding execution of mentally retarded individuals, Atkins v. Virginia, the Court acknowledged using a blend of the second and third approaches. 9 7 The Court pointed to what it saw as an emerging national consensus, reflected in recent legislation, as one objective indicator of current standards of decency. 9 8 Still, "objective evidence" does not "'wholly determine' the controversy, 'for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment."' 99 But capital cases are different in ways that matter to proportionality review. The punishment itself is so undeniably harsh that most bad acts never even raise the question: the Supreme Court's holding in Enmund v. Florida' 00 combined with legislative, prosecutorial, and juror decisions means that relatively few defendants are even eligible for the death penalty. Even fewer receive it and thereby raise questions of proportionality on appeal. Moreover, the punishment is indivisible: either a defendant will be executed or he won't; there is no question whether, although some execution is acceptable, he is being executed "too much." 10 ' But that is almost always the question in cases involving imprisonment, and [Vol 88:880 perhaps even life imprisonment.1 2 The Supreme Court could simply Redrup sentences,"' that is, overturn those that struck the Justices as excessive without providing extensive, or perhaps any, explanation. This would leave to the lower courts the job of determining inductively which sentences pass or fail constitutional proportionality review. 104 But that route will expose the Court to withering criticism and will essentially concede the subjective nature of proportionality review. Better not to undertake the inquiry at all.
Ultimately, proportionality review demands a judgment about the seriousness of a defendant's crime. Either the Supreme Court can look outward-to "the work product of legislatures and sentencing jury determinations"'0 5 -to see whether a particular case is an outlier or it can look inward-to the Justices' own understandings about the gravity of particular conduct. There is something ironic, then, about a Court committing itself to a judicially enforceable proportionality principle while ostensibly forswearing both strategies.
Although Harmelin and Ewing marked a retreat from pro-102. The difference between a life sentence and a sentence of fifty years may be entirely semantic: both will result in a middle-aged defendant spending the rest of his life in prison. Thus, a formal rule that applies proportionality review to life sentences or to life sentences without possibility of parole, but does not apply proportionality review to term sentences, may have no real effect. Prosecutors and judges could keep the defendants in jail for the rest of their lives by the simple expedient of seeking and imposing term sentences so long that defendants would never reach eligibility for parole. The case involved the interaction of two federal statutes. The first required individuals who transported more than $10,000 in currency out of the United States to file certain reports." 7 The second directed courts sentencing individuals for willful violations of the reporting requirements to order the forfeiture of any property involved in the offense.' 0 8 Hosep Bajakajian tried to leave the country with $357,144 in unreported cash. 1 0 9 The statutory maximum fine was $250,000,110 but under the federal sentencing guidelines, the fine for Bajakajian's conduct would have been only $5000."' After Bajakajian pleaded guilty to willfully failing to report the currency, the government moved to forfeit the entire amount. The district court denied the government's motion, concluding that complete forfeiture would be "extraordinarily harsh" and "grossly disproportionate to the offense in question."" Instead, it sentenced Bajakajian to three years' probation, fined him $5000, and ordered him to forfeit $15,000, "because the court believed that the maximum Guidelines fine was 'too little' and that a $15,000 forfeiture would 'make up for what I think a reasonable fine should be.""' 3 Ultimately the gravity of the offense that it is designed to punish."". 4 In trying to articulate "just how proportional to a criminal offense a fine must be,"" 5 the Court recognized that judicial determinations of offense gravity "will be inherently imprecise. " 116 Thus, relying on the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause cases, the Court adopted a standard of "gross disproportionality," rather than a requirement of "strict proportionality."" 7
Applying that standard, the Court concluded that forfeiture of $357,144 was grossly disproportionate because Bajakajian's crime reflected only a "minimal level of culpability."" 8 His sole transgression was failing to report the wholly legal act of taking currency out of the country. The only injury he inflicted was depriving the government of information about an otherwise innocuous movement of money.
As support for its conclusion that Bajakajian's culpability was relatively minor, the Court relied on the disparity between the punishment inflicted by the forfeiture provision-the loss of $357,144-and the punishments imposed under other aspects of the statutory scheme: "In considering an offense's gravity, the other penalties that the Legislature has authorized are certainly relevant evidence."" 9 But although the legislatively authorized penalties were perhaps not grossly disproportionate to the forfeiture-after all, the statute provided for a maximum fine of $250,000 plus up to five years' imprisonment, not to mention forfeiture itself-the Court declared that "any argument based solely on the statute" was "undercut" by the fact that "the maximum fine and Guideline sentence to which respondent was subject were but a fraction of the penalties authorized where the criminal punishment is a prison sentence. In deciding how culpable Bajakajian was, the Court looked to the harshness of other punishments imposed for the same conduct in other parts of the U.S. Code and contemplated by the sentencing guidelines-a species of intrajurisdictional analysis. The Court straddled the line between a normative and a descriptive view of proportionality: on the one hand, the majority announced that being stripped of $357,144 was grossly disproportionate to the degree of Bajakajian's wrongdoing; on the other, it treated the forfeiture as grossly disproportionate to other punishments imposed for Bajakajian's conduct. 122 Bajakajian departs from Harmelin and Ewing in another significant respect: the Court seems to analyze the gravity of Bajakajian's offense solely from a retributivist perspectiveasking how much harm his particular violation of the statute caused. Justice Kennedy treated Harmelin's offense more categorically, finding that "drugs relate to crime" at least in part because "violent crime may occur as part of the drug business or culture.
" 12 3 Thus, although there was no evidence that Harmelin himself had been involved in violence, either as a result of taking drugs, in order to obtain money to buy drugs, or as part of his participation in drug trafficking, he had nonetheless committed a serious crime. Similarly, Justice O'Connor treated Ewing's sentence as "justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons." 24 Had Justice Kennedy treated Bajakajian as a participant in the larger enterprise of currency smuggling, he might have viewed his crime quite differently. The dissenters, after all, thought forfeiture proportionate because "secret exports of money were being used in organized crime, drug trafficking, money laundering, and other [serious] crimes." 25 Moreover viewed as a goal of punishment," it brushed that point aside, concluding the same sentence with the observation that "forfeiture of the currency here does not serve the remedial purpose of compensating the Government for a loss." 12 6 But surely the prospect of being required to forfeit the entire amount of currency not reported would create a powerful deterrent to failing to report. If forfeiture is intended to deter future violations, rather than simply to compensate the government for the injury caused by the defendant, then presumably some multiplier of the actual harm caused could nonetheless be an appropriate punishment.
The procedural posture of the case spared the Supreme Court from having to decide the constitutionality of the $15,000 forfeiture ordered by the district court.' 7 But to the extent that the Bajakajian Court would not have struck down a more limited forfeiture-and it seems hard to imagine the Supreme Court holding that Congress could not authorize any forfeiture-the Court transferred the decision about the appropriate punishment from Congress, which had commanded full forfeiture of the currency involved, to individual trial courts, which would determine the appropriate level of forfeiture given the details of a particular defendant's case. Thus, Bajakajian, like Solem, seems to contemplate a regime of discretionary, rather than mandatory sentencing decisions, and provides relatively little guidance to lower courts about where to prick the lines 126. Id. at 329.
As the Bajakajian Court stated:
The only question before this Court is whether the full forfeiture of respondent's $357,144 as directed by § 982(a)(1) is constitutional under the Excessive Fines Clause. We hold that it is not. The Government petitioned for certiorari seeking full forfeiture, and we reject that request. Our holding that full forfeiture would be excessive reflects no judgment that [forfeiture of some lesser amount] ... would have suffered from a gross disproportion, nor does it affirm the reduced $15,000 forfeiture on de novo review. Those issues are simply not before us. Nor, indeed, do we address in any respect the validity of the forfeiture ordered by the District Court, including whether a court may disregard the terms of a statute that commands full forfeiture: As noted .... respondent did not cross-appeal the $15,000 forfeiture ordered by the District Court. The Court of Appeals thus declined to address the $15,000 forfeiture, and that question is not properly presented here either. Id. at 337 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court of appeals had held that any forfeiture for failure to report would violate the Excessive Fines Clause, see United States v. Bajakajian, 84 F.3d 334, 338 (9th Cir. 1996), before holding that Bajakajian's failure to cross-appeal had waived that argument.
between permissible and grossly disproportionate punishment.
B. A HARD RAIN'S GONNA FALL: BMW v. GORE AND THE EMERGENCE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES CASES
Perhaps it is only coincidence that it was also not until the 1980s that the Supreme Court showed interest in transforming the longstanding constitutional principle that civil damages awards cannot be "grossly excessive" 1 2 or "so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense"' 2 " into a judicially enforceable rule. The impetus for the Court's intervention was the perception that punitive damages had "run wild." 3° This perception reflected two developments: First, punitive damages had traditionally been used against spiteful or malicious defendants in intentional tort cases; they now emerged in product liability and other mass tort cases as well. Second, there was a striking increase in the size of high-end punitive awards, both in absolute terms and in comparison to the amount of compensatory damages.' The cases that the Supreme Court agreed to review involved multimillion-dollar pu- 1996) , the plaintiff suffered a loss of roughly $4000 because his luxury automobile was touched up to repair damage caused by acid rain and was awarded $4 million (reduced on appeal to $2 million) in punitive damages. 133. In Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 813, the defendant challenged the award on the grounds that the award was impermissible under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment and that the lack of sufficient standards governing punitive damages awards in Alabama violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. While the Court stated that these were 'important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be resolved," id. at 828-29, it disposed of the case on the ground that one of the judges should have recused himself for bias. In Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, the Court again appeared poised to address the constitutional constraints on punitive damages, but decided that the Eighth Amendment and due process challenges had been raised too "obliquely" in the state court proceedings to make federal review appropriate. 486 U.S. 71, 77 (1988 9 the Court articulated an approach to reviewing challenges to punitive damages awards that bears a striking resemblance to the Solem inquiry.
The underlying lawsuit involved a state-law fraud claim: Ira Gore bought a new BMW sports car that, unbeknownst to him, had been repainted because of exposure to acid rain during transit from the factory. 4° The repainting diminished the resale value of his $40,000 car by approximately $4000.1" When he found out (from "Mr. Slick," a detailer to whom he'd taken the car to "make it look snazzier than it normally would appear"), he sued. 142 Presented with evidence that BMW's policy had consistently been part of the common-law process of assessing punitive damages, they saw no federal constitutional right to a substantively correct determination of reasonableness in a given case. See id. at 470-72 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring). In other words, the fact that West Virginia had provided TXO with appellate review of the jury award was all that the Due Process Clause required. If the West Virginia courts simply reached the wrong result, that would raise no federal constitutional question. 137. 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 138. See id. at 457-58 (Stevens, J., joined by the Chief Justice and Blackmun, J.) (rejecting the idea that objective factors could be combined into a "test" like the kind of objective inquiry contemplated by Solem); id. at 466-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting the idea of a constitutional inquiry that focuses on the amount of the award in favor of one that looks at the jury's reasoning); id. at 470-72 (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting the entire enterprise of constitutional proportionality review). A number of states have adopted the mechanical approach legislatively. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991) (capping punitive damages at twice compensatory damages in products liability cases); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005 (Michie 2002) (capping punitive damages at three times the compensatory damages if compensatory damages are $100,000 or more and at $300,000 if the compensatory damages are less than $100,000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.14(b) (West 2000) (limiting punitive damages to five times compensatory damages or $350,000, whichever is greater); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1992) (capping all punitive damages at $350,000 when actual damages are less than $100,000).
139. 517 U.S. 559 (1996 as new, the jury awarded Gore $4000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages.' The trial judge denied BMW's motion to set aside the award as excessive.1 On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court held that the punitive damages award was tainted by the jury's consideration of sales in other jurisdictions, and reduced the amount of the award, concluding that "a constitutionally reasonable punitive damages award in this case is $2,000,000."
146
The United States Supreme Court did not question the jury's decision to award punitive damages, but it rejected even this lower amount, declaring it "apparent" that the $2 million was "grossly excessive."1 47 The Court identified three "guideposts" for assessing whether a punitive damages award is unconstitutionally high.1' The first, and "[p]erhaps the most important," was "the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct." 49 Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court pointed to the absence of any of "the aggravating factors associated with particularly reprehensible conduct," 5° such as violence, a noneconomic injury, calculated, purposeful wrongdoing, or recidi-143. Fourteen repainted cars were sold in Alabama, where Gore lived. See id. at 564. Roughly 600 repainted cars were sold in states where BMW's conduct would not even have constituted a tort, see id. at 573, let alone one warranting punitive damages.
144. Id. at 565. 145. Id. at 566. 146. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619, 629 (Ala. 1994). The Alabama Supreme Court provided no explanation for picking this number other than invocation of the multifactor substantive standard under Alabama law for imposing punitive damages and an assurance that the remittitur was the result of the court's having "thoroughly and painstakingly review[ed]" the jury award. Id. On remand from the United States Supreme Court, the Alabama Supreme Court reduced the amount of punitive damages to $50,000. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 701 So. 2d 507, 515 (Ala. 1997) (per curiam). While the Alabama Supreme Court discussed the various "guideposts" from the United States Supreme Court's decision and agreed that they rendered a $2 million award unjustifiable, the court offered no explanation for its decision that a $50,000 punitive damages award (as opposed to some higher or lower amount) was appropriate. vism ' 6' to conclude that even if BMW's behavior had been "sufficiently reprehensible to give rise to tort liability, and even a modest award of exemplary damages... , [it] was not sufficiently reprehensible to warrant imposition of a $2 million exemplary damages award."' 52 This first guidepost is essentially identical to the first (now threshold) factor in the Solem inquiry-the gravity of the offense. Indeed, the Court relied on Solem to illustrate an example of "the accepted view that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others. 1 53
The second guidepost---"ratio"' 5 -rested on a distinctive characteristic of damages actions: the fact finder is already asked, in determining the amount of compensatory damages, to quantify the amount of harm the defendant has caused to the plaintiff. By their very nature, then, damages cases provide a piece of information that criminal cases lack: an indication of the gravity of the offense that uses the very currency in which punishment is to be meted out. 55 "The principle that exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages" 56 suggested that a "breathtaking" ratio between the two should "surely raise a suspicious judicial eyebrow." 57 The Court declined to identify a precise point at which judicial brows and lungs would seize up. And it recognized that there needed to be some play in the joints, particularly because com-151. Gore had argued that the award was justified since BMW was "a recidivist" because of its pattern of selling repaired cars as new. See id. at 579. The Court rejected that contention on the merits, in part because BMW changed its policy once "it had been adjudged unlawful." Id. REv. 1139 (2000) . The authors "found a remarkable consensus in the judgments of individual jurors, made on a rating scale," about the seriousness of various wrongful behavior. Id. at 1141. But the study found that assessment of cases in terms of dollars produces great unpredictability. To be sure, ranking the cases by their aggregate dollar awards or by their aggregate punishment ratings produced very similar orderings of the cases from least to most severe. But dollar awards are unpredictable in the specific sense that punishment ratings are not .... [Tihe same case, presented to different jurors, will elicit similar ratings but quite different dollar awards ....
Id. at 1142 (citations omitted).
156. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580. 157. Id. at 583.
pensatory damages awards do not fully capture the magnitude of a defendant's wrongdoing in two ways relevant to determining punitive damages. As a matter of retribution, compensatory awards will understate the defendant's moral culpability in cases where the defendant's wrongful designs are not fully realized. 158 Moreover, because punitive damages are intended to deter, a punitive damages award might also properly reflect "the possible harm to other victims that might ... result[] if similar future behavior were not deterred," 5 9 a harm obviously not captured in the compensatory award to the present-day victim. Still, statutory punitive damages schemes generally doubled, trebled, or quadrupled the amount of compensatory damages to determine the amount of punitives. 6 And in prior cases reviewing common-law punitive damages, the Supreme Court had expressed qualms about, but ultimately upheld, ratios in the range of ten to one.1 6 ' By contrast, Gore's case involved a far higher ratio: his punitive damages were 500 times his actual harm (and there seemed not to be any unrealized potential harm to him) and thirty-five times the harm suffered by all consumers in Alabama. 158. See id. at 581 (stating "the proper inquiry is whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred" (internal quotations and emphasis omitted)).
159. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 460 (1993) (Stevens, J.).
160. See Gore, 517 U.S. at 581 (discussing the long history of multipliers); id. at 615-16 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing recent statutes).
161. See TXO, 509 U.S. at 462. The majority thought TXO a close case: the deciding factor for the Justices who performed a proportionality review but upheld the verdict seems to have been the defendant's persistent bad faith. See id. at 462 (Stevens, J.); id. at 468 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In TXO, the punitive damages award was 526 times greater than the damages actually awarded by the jury, see id. at 453, but the Court noted that the jury might have concluded that the "potential harm" had TXO "succeeded in its illicit scheme" might have been $1 million, rather than $19,000, in which case the punitive damages would have been ten times the potential harm. 162. Gore, 517 U.S. at 582 & n.35. Earlier, the Court held that federalism and interstate commerce concerns limited Alabama to imposing liability awards that protect "its own consumers and its own economy," not to regulating the nationwide market in automobile sales. Id. at 572-73.
163. 123 S. Ct. 1513 Ct. (2003 .
[Vol 88:880 might be seen as a plastic limit: "in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process.' 64 Thus, the Court held that a punitive damages award of $145 million was excessive given a compensatory damages award of $1 million in a case alleging bad-faith refusal to settle an insurance claim. 165 The third guidepost identified by the Gore Court as a useful indicator of excessiveness involved comparing the punitive damages award to the civil or criminal penalties a defendant would have faced for the same conduct.
1 6 6 This factor incorporates the intra-and inter-jurisdictional comparisons of the Solem test. In Gore, the Court noted that the maximum civil penalty for BMW's conduct under Alabama law was $2000 and there was no suggestion of criminal liability.
16 7 Similarly, in the other states in which BMW's actions would have been prohibited, the civil penalties ranged only up to $10,000. Thus, there was no state in which a legislature had affirmatively authorized punishing a defendant like BMW with a multimilliondollar fine for this kind of conduct." 6 In comparing the punitive damages award to the amount of punishment authorized under criminal and civil statutes, the Court essentially deployed the principle of "substantial deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions" 1 69 to justify, rather than to constrain, judicial review. The 164. Id. at 1524. For one recent case where a court upheld a far higher ratio (approving $186,000 in punitive damages for a claim that resulted in only $5000 in compensatory damages), see Mathias v. Accor Economy Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2003). Judge Posner's opinion for the court explained that the punitive damages awarded in the case could be justified as a response to the fact that not every victim of the defendants' wrongdoing-they continued to rent hotel rooms infested with bedbugs-would have detected the tortious behavior (and thus deterrence theory supported a high punitive damages award) and that no plaintiff might have brought a lawsuit at all without the prospect of heavy punitive damages (a private attorney general rationale). As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, while criminal sentences in state prosecutions can be challenged in federal habeas corpus proceedings as well as on direct appeal, 7 ' the Supreme Court will be "the only federal court policing the area"' 73 of punitive damages, at least with respect to reviewing verdicts in state court litigation.' Justice Ginsburg intimated that this 171. 517 U.S. at 613-14 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 172. This past Term, for example, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of California's "three-strikes" law in one case on direct appeal, Ewing v. California, 123 S. Ct. 1179 Ct. (2003 , and one case on collateral review, Lockyer v. Andrade, 123 S. Ct. 1166 Ct. (2003 .
173. Gore, 517 U.S. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct., 1513 Ct., , 1527 Ct., (2003 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (repeating the same argument).
174. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment presumably contains the same substantive constraint that punitive damages also not be grossly was problematic because the Court would not "be aided by the federal district courts and courts of appeals.",1 5 But perhaps it is actually a benefit of proportionality review in the civil context that there is such a limited opportunity for federal intervention in particular cases. After all, one of the disadvantages of the Eighth Amendment proportionality principle was the possibility that it could have spawned wholesale collateral litigation, clogging federal court dockets. At the same time, given the subjective, takes-the-judicial-breath-away-and-raises-the-judicialeyebrows test, the availability of collateral review would have given federal judges that did not share the Justices' assessment of the gravity of particular offenses the power to overturn state criminal sentences. Thus, the Court might have had to police the lower federal courts as well as the state courts. By contrast, the structure of civil litigation makes such collateral attacks vanishingly rare. 7 ' So, having announced a general principle of proportionality for state appellate courts to apply, the Supreme Court can reserve to itself the ability to set aside awards "at which five Members of the Court bridle."' 7 The In an important sense, proportionality is about federalism. The states are the primary source for both criminal and tort law. There is relatively little constitutional limitation on the sort of behavior a state can criminalize or for which it can impose civil liability. At the same time, there is a significant territorial limitation on the reach of a state's power. This territorial limitation seems to have caused relatively little constitutional litigation in the criminal arena. But the recent punitive damages cases before the Court have involved an extraterritorial dimension. In Campbell, the plaintiffs presented evidence of State Farm's claims settlement and personnel practices nationwide, and the Court expressed concern that the case was "used as a platform to expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies of State Farm's operations throughout the country."
81
This was troubling both because it posed a risk that a defendant might be punished "for conduct that may have been lawful where it occurred" and because states generally lack "a legitimate concern in imposing punitive damages to punish a defendant for unlawful acts committed outside of the State's jurisdiction.", 82 With respect to this latter principle, permitting the imposition of "extraterritorial" punitive damages created the possibility of "multiple," and unjustifiable, punitive damages awards, since state courts might give no weight to punitive damages awards imposed in other states.' 83 And the cases implicate the national strand of federalism as well. Although the states are free to adopt different positions on how to impose punishment and on how much punishment to impose, there is some constitutional limit on the degree of permissible deviation from national norms. The interjurisdictional analyses required by the third Solem factor and the third Gore guidepost tap into this idea. [Vol 88:880 million in punitive damages for a cosmetic flaw in his car's paint job 8 " imposed punishments that are descriptively out of line with the mine run of judgments. The proportionality principle accords normative constitutional force to these deviations. Institutional factors may affect quite profoundly the way the Court thinks about how to control the level of criminal punishment and civil sanctions. To understand this point more fully requires considering how the Court has treated one of the most important institutional actors in the adjudicatory process: the jury.
II. THE ALLURE AND DANGER OF THE JURY
Although the Rehnquist Court has significantly relaxed the substantive constitutional constraint on criminal sentences, it has revived a key procedural limitation. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 86 the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases the authorized sentence a defendant faces must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury. This decision has already spawned a torrent of litigation' 8 7 and the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions seem likely to produce yet more litigation. 18 8 For our purposes, the central point of the Apprendi line of cases can be stated simply: The Court held that the Constitution imposes procedural constraints on the contemporary practice of enhancing a defendant's sentence on the basis of particular details about his offense. 18 9 The Due Process Clause requires that these facts be proved proven beyond a reasonable doubt, rather than by some lower standard, such as preponderance of the evidence. 9 0 And the Sixth Amendment requires that these facts be proved to a jury, rather than found by a sentencing judge. 191 Apprendi itself involved a fairly common statutory scheme. Early one morning, Charles Apprendi fired his gun into the home of a black couple who had recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood.
9 2 He was charged in a twentythree-count indictment with a litany of first-, second-, third-, and fourth-degree offenses. 9 Ultimately, he agreed to a plea in which the top count was a second-degree offense-possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.' 94 Normally, second-degree offenses are punishable by imprisonment for between five and ten years. 9 But New Jersey also had an "extended term" law.' 96 Under this law, defendants who met certain criteria, such as being persistent offenders, committing the crime while being involved in gang activity, committing the crime against certain particularly vulnerable victims, or, as in Charles Apprendi's case, committing the crime "with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity," became eligible for longer sentences. 19 7 In the case of second-degree offenses, instead of facing five to ten years, defendants faced terms of ten to twenty years.' 9 Pursuant to the extended term law, the judge sentenced Apprendi to twelve years' imprison-ment after concluding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Apprendi had acted with racial bias. 99 The Apprendi Court held the New Jersey extended term law was unconstitutional insofar as it enhanced sentences for factors other than the existence of prior criminal convictions.°0 Thus, it overturned the trial judge's decision to sentence Apprendi to twelve years' imprisonment based on his finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Apprendi had acted with a racially intimidating purpose.
2 0 ' The Apprendi principle has been extended to other enhancing factors, such as higher sentences based on the quantity or type of drugs sold, the use of a weapon in the commission of a particular offense, or the presence of vulnerable victims.
2 02
With respect to one category of cases-prosecutions where the facts justifying an enhanced sentence are relatively objective-it may well be that the most significant long-term effect of Apprendi, if it has legs at all, lies not so much in the greater difficulty of persuading juries, rather than judges, to find the facts justifying an enhanced sentence, but in the higher burden of proof required by the Due Process Clause. 0 3 But with respect to enhancing factors that are less clearly objective-such as a defendant's particular moral culpability-Apprendi may actually provide some protection against "oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers." 2 4
Consider, for example, the question of capital punishment, to which the Court extended Apprendi's reasoning in Ring v. Arizona. 2 0 5 A central question in capital cases is the presence of aggravating factors that make the defendant particularly morally culpable and deserving of death. Prior to Ring, most states already lodged the decision whether to sentence a defendant to death or some lesser penalty in the jury.°6 But four statesDelaware, Alabama, Florida, and Indiana-permitted judges to override the jury's initial determination.
A study of decisions between 1976 and 1995 in the latter three states showed that judges were three times more likely to override a jury's life sentence than they were to override a jury's death sentence in favor of life.
2 08 Roughly a quarter of the inmates on Alabama's death row originally received a life sentence from the jury. 2 9 So it may turn out that Apprendi exercises some constraint on the level of punishment the state can inflict.
But the Court's decision in Harris v. United States 21° removes the possibility that Apprendi might be used to address the troubling problem raised by Harmelin: that mandatory minimum sentences may impose excessive punishment. 2 In Harris, a fractured Court held that Apprendi did not apply to facts that increase the mandatory minimum sentence a defendant must serve, as long as those facts do not extend the sentence beyond the otherwise applicable statutory maximum.
1 2
Thus, as long as a legislature is willing to authorize a particular punishment for all defendants convicted of a crime with particular elements, it can cabin judicial discretion by requiring the judge, upon additional findings, to impose a particular sentence within the previously authorized range. 213 In contrast to the criminal cases, where the current Court has revived the central role of the jury, the Court's punitive damages cases have evinced skepticism about the jury's role. Most recently, in Cooper Industries v. Leatherman Tool Group, the Court held that federal courts of appeals should review district court determinations of the constitutionality of punitive damages awards de novo, rather than under the dramatically less demanding abuse-of-discretion standard. 214 While the decision imposes a formally symmetric rule-an appellate court might, after all, just as easily reinstate a jury verdict overturned by a trial judge as overturn a verdict sustained by the trial judge 21 5 -the Supreme Court clearly assumed that de novo review would provide two opportunities to bring excessive punitive damages awards into line. 216 In explaining its reasoning, the Court pointed to the relative institutional competence of trial and appellate judges. 17 While trial judges might enjoy "somewhat superior vantage over courts of appeals" with respect to the first Gore guidepost-the gravity or reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct-appellate judges were equally, if not better positioned to conduct the broad legal comparison demanded by the third guidepost, namely an analysis of the civil and criminal penalties provided for the defendant's conduct. 218 The Court also drew an explicit comparison to the criminal context that suggests why its perspective on the jury's role differs in criminal and civil cases:
Legislatures have extremely broad discretion in defining criminal offenses and in setting the range of permissible punishments for each offense, Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) . Judicial decisions that operate within these legislatively enacted guidelines are typically reviewed for abuse of discretion.... [Cif. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (it is permissible "for judges to exercise discretion ... in imposing a judgment within the range prescribed by statute").
As in the criminal sentencing context, legislatures enjoy broad discretion in authorizing and limiting permissible punitive damages awards. A good many States have enacted statutes that place limits on the permissible size of punitive damages awards. When juries make particular awards within those limits, the role of the trial judge is "to determine whether the jury's verdict is within the confines set by state law, and to determine, by reference to federal standards developed Criminal juries are already circumscribed in two important ways. First, in the absence of common-law crimes, the jury's ability to punish is constrained by a legislatively enacted statutory maximum. Thus, assuming that the statutory maximum is itself constitutionally unobjectionable, the only risk of excessive punishment comes from the imprecision of the statute.
In ad dition, the state makes a second politically accountable decision about the defendant's potential punishment when the prosecutor makes her charging decision. A prosecutor might choose not to charge enhancing factors or the most serious offense in cases where the defendant, although he fits the letter of the statute, lacks the moral culpability to warrant a higher penalty. By contrast, in the absence of statutory ratio limits or damages caps, civil juries are not constrained by legislative or executive decisions. 22 Ct. 1513 Ct. , 1520 Ct. (2003 (noting that "[alithough these awards serve the same purposes as criminal penalties, defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases have not been accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding"). downward. They are not exercising their discretion within a carefully defined sphere. It is thus not entirely surprising that the Supreme Court would see a greater appropriate role for the judicial branch in this arena.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decisions over the past twenty years with respect to constitutional limits on sentences and damages seem at first in some tension with one another. Having embraced and then largely abandoned a judicially enforceable constitutional requirement of proportionality under the Eighth Amendment in criminal cases, the Court has articulated an increasingly robust requirement of proportionality under the Due Process Clause in punitive damages cases. Differences between the two kinds of litigation may, however, explain why proportionality review is relatively more attractive in punitive damages cases. First, the Court may perceive the existence of more objective indicia of excessiveness in the punitive damages cases. Second, the punitive damages cases may raise reverse federalism concerns that are absent from criminal prosecutions. Third, the Supreme Court may think the level of federal intrusion can be better controlled in the civil context. And finally, criminal cases may involve sufficient oversight by politically accountable actors. Although the Court may still be merely "pricking the lines" when it comes to the question of when sentences are excessive or punitive damages are grossly disproportionate, we can now step back and see a pattern to its overall approach.
